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Following is unclassified summary of main points discussed during nearly two-hour long meeting between Secretary and Alphand May 28 based on unclassified memcon. Discussion was exploratory, designed define areas of agreement and extent of disagreements.

1. Secretary regretted press speculation in Bonn concerning his visit there. Said he had mentioned to Couve in Athens possibility of European trip including visit to Bonn and Paris. Timing of trip not firm but his tentative plan was to leave in third week of June to visit Paris, *Bonn and UK* (to receive honorary degree at Oxford). ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

2. "Third Force". Alphand said press had distorted de Gaulle's recent statements making it appear de Gaulle anti-US and anti-US and coping with independent policy toward

TELETYPE: *Johnson*:AMR 5/31

Telegraphic transmission and
 classification approved by:

EUR - William R. Tyler

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Soviets. Press had ignored de Gaulle's frequent references to Atlantic Alliance. De Gaulle was opposed to neutral Europe. He therefore opposed negotiations on Berlin now precisely because this might lead to neutral Germany, and by extension to neutral Europe. De Gaulle's references to balance in Europe were made from point of view of historian concerned with long-term developments and based on assumption that eventually serious negotiations with Soviets leading to detente could be conducted.

Secretary said that without any briefing on our part press had begun talk about Third Force in connection with de Gaulle's press conference. This touched sensitive nerve. Concept that Europe could be arbiter between US and Soviets was basically fallacious. Europe was key issue outstanding between US and USSR. If ever Europe decided play independent role, issues between US and USSR would be greatly reduced. In a sense, US rather than Europe was "Third Force" in this combination. Alphand reiterated there was no question of neutral posture on part of France.

3. Structure of NATO. Secretary said we had accepted concept of defending principles of alliance in remotest corners of world. Did de Gaulle equate such commitments with defense of France?

Alphand

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Alphand said it was form rather than substance of alliance that was issue. De Gaulle fully accepted principle of alliance. Main French concern was possible German neutralism or revival of Rapallo spirit.

Alphand declined comment on de Gaulle's plans for reform of NATO except in general terms: Greater role of Europe and US loss of nuclear monopoly must be taken into account. Alphand said he not informed on de Gaulle's precise views how NATO should be reorganized, suggested this would be proper topic for discussion between Secretary and Couve and agreed inform Couve that Secretary would like hear French views.

Secretary said we had gone far to underline NATO solidarity. We had promised consult about use of nuclear weapons anywhere. To Alphand's point that de Gaulle desired closer tripartite consultation and some tripartite planning organization and that de Gaulle's January 11 memorandum had never been answered, Secretary said implications of special position of Three would create problems in NATO. Alphand said experience in NAC had shown that if US, UK and France agree, others concur. Secretary said new strength of Europe had also affected other European countries who would demand greater voice. Alphand agreed and said this problem linked to organization of

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of Europe. If European Community included agreement relating to defense, alliance would have to take this into account. GOF now actively considering this problem, which could be additional topic for discussion with Couve.

4. Organization of Europe. Alphand said de Gaulle not opposed to British entry. Economic problems involved posed no essential differences from those confronting US. UK must enter without Commonwealth although there could be period of adjustment. Regarding French African possessions there might be longer period of adaptation for political reasons until there was some global arrangement. On political side there might be problems. Questionable whether European spirit compatible with British outlook. Certainly Europe of Six would be more coherent than Europe of Seven or Nine. Wondered why US desired UK to become politically additional member of Common Market.

Secretary said this was trend of history. Commonwealth no longer really operational unit. Britain belongs to Europe, and Channel less of an obstacle than former French-German antagonism which had been liquidated. UK membership would contribute to cohesiveness of Europe in long run and would help reassure

Germany.

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Germany. Also, joint French-UK efforts, especially in Africa and UN, could be extremely effective and helpful to us. Alphand said there was no basic disagreement between France and UK outside of Europe; main problem was UK position on relations with Soviets and doubts whether UK really European-minded. Certainly de Gaulle's concept of European political community suited British better than concept of EUR integration.

5. Relations between US and Europe. Secretary said unnecessary theoretical debates about US relationship with Europe should be avoided. Practical fact was that we had given up sovereignty in many fields and would continue draw closer to Europe. Alphand said de Gaulle did not suggest we should get out of Europe, but rather that we should not get into details, but permit Europe establish its own organization. Secretary said we had no blueprint for Europe, nor did we desire controversy about our relationship with Europe. European solidarity was in our national interest. Alphand observed US would sometimes be accused of playing one European power against other, sometimes of favoring United Europe in order to be able to dominate it better.

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